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NOTICE
Cyberdemons: Regulating a Truly World-Wide Web
Andrew P. Lycans*
BEYOND OUR CONTROL?: CONFRONTING THE LIMITS OF OUR
LEGAL SYSTEM IN THE AGE OF CYBERSPACE. By Stuart Biegel.

Cambridge: The MIT Press. 2001. Pp. v, 452. Cloth, $34.95.
In the decade leading up to the twenty-first century, the number of
Internet-related legal disputes grew exponentially. This growth con
tinues into the new millennium, introducing old problems in a new
context. For instance, in the field of copyright, Eric Eldred, the opera
tor of a website dedicated to posting literary works already in the
public domain, challenged the Copyright Term Extension Act
("CTEA").1 The CTEA blocked his plans to post works copyrighted
in 1923, works which under the previous statute would have entered
the public domain in 1999.2 Looking to trademark law, the field has
become obsessed of late with providing a quick and easy way for
trademark holders to regain domain names from cybersquatters with
out "paying them off. "3 In the First Amendment arena, the Internet
continues to present challenges to the concept of a community stan
dard of decency in obscenity jurisprudence.4 The Ninth Circuit re
cently pushed the boundaries of jurisdictional law, in an interesting
example of the courts keeping pace with the times, when it ruled that
plaintiffs could deliver service of process by e-mail when the defen
dant resides outside the country, if the plaintiff obtains a court

* The author would like to thank Anna-Rose Mathieson and Roberta J. Morris for their
helpful comments on an earlier draft.

1.

Eldred v. Ashcroft, 123

S.Ct. 769 (2003).

Plaintiff's complaint, Eldred, 123 S.Ct. 769 (2003), available at http://eon.law.harvard.
edu/openlaw/eldredvashcroft/cyber/complaint_orig.html. Eldred operates Eldritch press
(http://eldritchpress.org) and had anticipated posting such works as New Hampshire by Rob
ert Frost, Horses and Men by Sherwood Anderson, and Racundra's First Cruise by Arthur
Ransome, all written in 1923 and scheduled to come off copyright in 1999.
2.

3. See generally JANE c. GINSBURG ET AL., TRADEMARK AND UNFA I R COMPETITION
LAW765-829 (2001).
4. See generally Ashcroft v. ACLU , 535 U.S. 564 (2002) (discussing at length whether
the community-standards test should apply online where distributors neither know nor could
know the location of the websurfers accessing the site).
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order allowing service of process by e-mail under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 4(f)(3).5
Amid these decisions, Stuart Biegel6 attempts to craft a model of
when and how regulators should go about attempting to bring order to
the perceived anarchy of cyberspace. Biegel begins by noting "the
commonly accepted notion that no one is in charge" of the Internet (p.
3), then goes on to debunk this notion by listing a number of agencies
and groups that attempt to exert some level of control over the Net
and "Netizens."7 He then compares perceptions of Internet regulation
to popular notions of the law in the American Old West, demonstrat
ing how both differ significantly from reality.8
Before devising a new regulatory model, Biegel asks whether the
Internet presents a new entity, something distinct from what came
before, and for which no elaborate and extensive bodies of law already
exist (pp. 25-26). After a short review of the possibly analogous bodies
of law,9 Biegel concludes that the Internet clearly entails something
different, leaving only the question of whether it "merit[s] new and
different approaches to regulatory issues" (p. 31). Although Biegel
answers this question sometimes yes, sometimes no, he arrives at this
conclusion only after a (maybe overly) exhaustive review of previous
popular and scholarly works. Given his goal of debunking some
popular misconceptions, perhaps this analysis serves Biegel well in
coming to a realistic answer about the need to regulate.
The belief that regulating cyberspace presents an all-or-nothing
proposition represents the chief misconception Biegel dispels.10 He
emphasizes that regulators may decide to regulate some areas of
cyberspace while leaving others alone, and that they may take differ
ent approaches when regulating different conduct in cyberspace.
These points stand out as Biegel's main contributions in this work (p.
119). Many pioneer Netizens have a libertarian bent and believe that
5. See Rio Properties, Inc. v. Rio Int'! Interlink, 284 F.3d 1007, 1015 (2002). Fittingly, the
underlying dispute involved trademark infringement, specifically the defendant's chosen
domain name. Id. at 1012-13. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(f)(3) states:
Service Upon Individuals in a Foreign Country. Unless otherwise provided by federal law.
service upon an individual from whom a waiver has not been obtained and filed, other than
an infant or incompetent person, may be effected in a place not within any judicial district of
the United States . . . by other means not prohibited by international agreement as may be
directed by the court.
6. Professor of Education and Information Studies, Professor of Law, UCLA.
7. Pp. 4-12. Occupants of cyberspace frequently refer to themselves as Netizens, an ab
breviation based on an abbreviation (Net for Internet and Netizen for Internet Citizen).
8. P. 7. Biegel does this by using the plots of Western movies. Shane represents the best
metaphor to the Internet in his view. P. 18.
9. He considers if the Internet is analogous to a library, a phone system, a park, a televi
sion, or a newspaper. Pp. 26-27.
10. P. 51. Biegel clarifies the all or nothing terminology by saying: "Control or no con
trol. Censorship or no censorship. Rules or no rules." P. 51.
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the government should avoid any form of cyberspace regulation,
though as Biegel points out some of these "libertarians" asked the
government to step in to limit what private entities can achieve
through the Internet (p. 193). Similarly, regulators may tend to view
the Internet as a monolithic entity, and believe comprehensive regula
tion indispensable to crafting an adequate response to any cyberprob
lem (pp. 51-54, 119). Biegel maintains regulation in this area could
very well prove more effective, and regulators could better avoid unin
tended consequences, if they considered particular problem areas
individually (p. 54).
This Notice argues that, though following the model might help
would-be regulators analyze "cyberproblems," Biegel fails to accu
rately apply the model in the examples he provides. Part I describes
Biegel's model for categorizing cyberspace problems and for ap
proaching regulation. Part II argues that Biegel's categories lack
comprehensiveness, and that Biegel undermines his model by inaccu
rately applying it to difficult situations.
I.

BIEGEL'S FRAMEWORK FOR ANALYZING CYBERSPACE
PROBLEMS AND REGULATION

Biegel establishes a five-step framework for analyzing problematic
conduct in cyberspace and for determining how to regulate it. The first
step involves placing the behavior into one of four broad categories
Biegel provides and then identifying representative characteristics (p.
224). Once a regulator categorizes the problem, the second step forces
him to consider the potential for consensus regarding the nature and
extent of the problem, and the potential for any regulatory consensus
among stakeholders (p. 224). The third step involves considering
whether the problem is uniquely cyber, or if an existing regulatory
scheme could address it (p. 224). Subsequently, step four requires
evaluation of the potential effectiveness of the three regulatory mod
els identified by Biegel.11 Finally, at step five the regulator must con
sider the impact of each regulatory model in combination with the
others and predict whether any regulation could adequately address
the potential problem at this time (p. 225).
In the first step of his framework, Biegel attempts to divide all
cyberproblems into four simple categories: 1) Dangerous Conduct,
2) Fraudulent Conduct, 3) Unlawful Anarchic Conduct, and 4)
Inappropriate Conduct (p. 54). He defines Dangerous Conduct as
"acts and behaviors that may impact physical or national security"
(p. 55). Biegel includes threatening behavior such as cyberstalking
(p. 55), creating and trafficking in child pornography (p. 57), unli-

11. P. 224. Discussed infra notes 13-18 and accompanying text.
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censed online healthcare (p. 58), and cyberterrorism (p. 62) under this
heading. Fraudulent Conduct encompasses hacking that leads to
financial loss (p. 65); traditional fraud in an online setting (p. 70) and
deceitful business practices, including noncompliance with posted pri
vacy statements (p. 66); and the undisclosed gathering of information
by recording the users Internet protocol address. Unlawful Anarchic
Conduct - the least self-defining of the groups - involves conduct
"which may. . . be illegal but may not necessarily be criminal" (p. 73).
This would include copyright violations (p. 73), exposing others to
pornographic content without adequate warning (p. 80), and online
defamation (p. 81). One could fairly describe Inappropriate Conduct
as a catchall category for other acts that many people do not like but
which nevertheless remain lawful. The author gives the example of
hate-related websites as typical of this category (p. 87), as well as
overly aggressive business tactics (p. 91), discriminatory "hostile envi
ronment" harassment (p. 87), and inappropriate online activity in an
education setting (p. 88).
Biegel believes that placing problematic behavior into one of these
four categories makes it easier to identify common characteristics the
"cyberproblems" share. Though he lists the potential for consensus as
a separate step in his analysis (p. 225), in fact Biegel assumes that
where the behavior falls in the hierarchy generally reflects the existing
level of consensus.12 Thus, activity which physically harms others such
as online child pornography will likely garner a wide consensus con
demning the behavior, while socially unacceptable conduct - which
Biegel admits will likely engender debate even about what qualifies as
unacceptable - will produce little consensus.
The third step, considering whether a problem is uniquely cyber,
looks to whether current law can adequately handle the "cyberprob
lem" without additional regulatory activity (p. 97). The regulator must
also ask if the complexity of the issues along with the multiplicity of
variables would make any attempt at regulation either ineffective, or
the effects unpredictable (p. 107).
Biegel also expends a significant amount of time discussing the
three models of regulation he utilizes in step four of his overall ap
proach. He believes these models capable of comprehensively regu
lating Internet conduct (p. 220). The first regulatory model consists of
the traditional method of applying national laws to a problem and de
veloping new laws as necessary (p. 123). The United States can often
effectively employ this form of regulation as the "great majority of
online users at this point in time are American[s]" (p. 125). Although
the U.S. can currently handle many problems through purely national
legislation, as the Internet becomes a truly worldwide phenomenon,
12. Pp. 223, 235. See infra note 41 for a discussion of the likely disagreement about be
haviors falling into categories three and four.
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this will become an increasingly less effective solution. As an initial
matter, however, Biegel points out that this approach may fail in the
short term more often than one might think. Frequently, this comes
about because attempts to regulate the Internet often run into First
Amendment problems, and the courts have struck down some of
Congress's most high-profile attempts to regulate in this area.13
Further, from a logistical standpoint, the sheer volume of online
material inhibits effective regulation (p. 140).
The second regulatory model addresses international consensus on
how to handle a problem in cyberspace (p. 157). Such consensus has
the advantage of simplifying the complexity created by jurisdictional
problems and a multitude of individual nations' laws (p. 158). Plus,
some problems remain beyond any single nation's ability to resolve.
Given the global nature of the Internet, individual nation-states
cannot control all Internet behavior that has an effect within their
borders.14 The drawback of international laws, of course, comes from
the need to find a consensus position each country will implement
faithfully (p. 158). Despite this liability, international rules and proce
dures already successfully control some online transactions.15
The final regulatory approach considers changing the software
codes that allow people to act in ways that national governments or
the international community have deemed inappropriate (p. 187).
Some argue that such "architectural changes" produce "immediate,
final, and complete transformation[s]" (p. 188). Regulators cannot,
however, ignore the fact that code changes by the "powers that be," as
Biegel calls them, inevitably evoke responses by Netizens with the
technological know-how to implement their own code countermea
sures (p. 208). As Biegel defines the term, however, code-based solu
tions can also entail efforts undertaken at the individual level.16 Thus,
filtering software employed to protect children and those with delicate
sensibilities also qualifies under this category (pp. 200, 204-07).
13. P. 1 55. One prominent example would be the Communications Decency Act, Pub.
L. No. 1 04-104 5-502, § 110 Stat. 133 (1996). The Court struck down two highly controversial
provisions, ostensibly meant to protect children, in Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
P. 129. Biegel also discusses the Child Online Protection Act ("COPA"), 47 U.S.C. § 231
(1998), which the district court struck down, with the Third Circuit affirming this decision.
Pp. 136-39. The Supreme Court, however, revers.ed, finding the COPA valid on its face.
Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002). Biegel also takes this discussion as an opportunity
to point out the inappropriateness of individual states within the United States attempting to
regulate Internet activity as some have done recently. Pp. 152-54.
14. See, e.g., Mike McPhee, Items Taken in Ft. Collins Raid Under Study, DENVER POST,
Sept. 5, 1998, at Bl (describing international cooperation in twenty-two countries to orches
trate simultaneous raids against child-pornography ring using encryption technology).
15. P. 176. In some e-commerce situations, Biegel believes that international rules and
procedures control. P. 176.
16. P. 205. Biegel provides no explanation why self-help remedies qualify as part of a
regulatory model.
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The final step in Biegel's model synthesizes the options presented
by the three regulatory models, taking into account the particular
problem under consideration, to produce a coherent regulatory
approach (p. 225). Thus, for something such as child pornography,
Biegel's model calls for individual nations to outlaw it and for some
international agreement to prevent child exploiters from taking advan
tage of international borders. Additionally, code-based solutions, such
as removing any sites containing child pornography from the root
server, also exist.17
II. EXAMINING THE ASSUMPTIONS UNDERLYING BIEGEL'S
APPLICATION OF THE FRAMEWORK
Although the theoretical framework presented by Biegel may
pique academic interest, the real value of the theory should come in its
application since he designed it for real-world regulators. Unfortu
nately, while the framework does present some practical benefits, the
model applications presented by Biegel raise problems. The following
Part demonstrates that Biegel's model applications fail to faithfully
implement the framework he developed. Sections II.A and II.B ques
tion the viability of the categorization step as it now stands, and sug
gest a slight alteration. Section II.C considers Biegel's proposal for
dealing with online copying, the issue that "has become for many the
paradigmatic cyberspace-related inquiry" (p. 74). Finally, Section II.D
argues Biegel's decision to reject including private ordering in the
model can cause regulators to ignore real solutions.
A. Inconsistent Categorization: The Nuremberg Files
Biegel's theory behind the four categories of cyberproblems18
implies that the lower the number in his hierarchy, the easier it should
be to establish a consensus on the need for action (p. 235). Thus, one
can easily see why threats delivered over the Internet and child
pornography would fall into the Dangerous Conduct category. Oddly
though, Biegel also includes the facts of Planned Parenthood of the
Columbia/Williamette v. American Coalition of Life Activists19 as
something that falls into the Dangerous Conduct category (p. 56).
There an anti-abortion group, the American Coalition of Life
17. P. 274. Thirteen root servers containing "authoritative lists of domain names and
their corresponding IP numbers" make up the root server system. Root Server A is the main
computer holding the address database. P. 194. The Eastern District of Virginia has already
directed a website off the Internet by suspending a defendant's domain name registration. P.
274.
1 8. 1 ) Dangerous Conduct 2) Fraudulent Conduct 3) Unlawful Anarchic Conduct, and
4) Inappropriate Conduct. P. 55.
19. 244 F.3d 1007 (9th Cir. 2001).
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Activists ("ACLA") maintained detailed dossiers it called the
Nuremberg Files so that "Nuremberg-like war crimes trials could be
conducted in 'perfectly legal courts once the tide of the nation's opin
ion turns against the wanton slaughter of God's children.' "20 The
ACLA shared these dossiers with Neal Horsley, including the abor
tion doctors' names and current addresses, which Horsley posted on
his website.21 Whenever someone killed an abortion provider, Horsley
would cross off the doctor's name on the posted list.22
Biegel's categorization of the Nuremberg Files website in
American Coalition creates internal inconsistencies in his categories
for two reasons. First, while the district court did find for the plaintiff
doctors, the Ninth Circuit overturned this decision "applying basic
First Amendment principles" - to quote Biegel (p. 56). Though
Biegel notes the controversy this caused, the fact that this case raised
so much controversy indicates that Biegel may have miscategorized
the activity under his own model.23 The authorities can clearly pro
scribe the other activities he uses as examples for this category, as the
public overwhelmingly supports such limits. Under current law, how
ever, Horsley can operate his website without state interference. Thus,
no strong consensus emerges that the law must do something about
this site - since many would agree the First Amendment bars the
state from doing anything.
The second problem follows from the fact that this site seems to fit
squarely within the category of Inappropriate Conduct. When giving a
sample application of the model within the Inappropriate Conduct
category, Biegel goes through a long analysis on how the government
could ban hate-related websites if First Amendment law changes (pp.
321-52). This chapter seems to describe exactly the kind of website at
issue in American Coalition. Biegel might argue he could differentiate
the two sites because Horsley's site referred to specific people, thus
perhaps seeming more like a threat, while a generic racially based
hate-related website might not mention specific people - though
many likely do. Since the sites simply promote different kinds of hate,
however, the same category should apply. In the end, it seems that the
American Coalition site fits better in the Inappropriate Conduct
category - many believe the site operator should not have posted the
Nuremberg Files, some would deny the site First Amendment protec
tion, but the majority of Americans believe it protected (p. 348). This
20. Id. at 1012-13 .
21. Id. at 1013.
22. Id. He grayed out the names of the wounded. Id. The plaintiffs, however, did not sue
Horsley. Id. at nl.
23. "For the problems in categories 1 and 2, consensus is not typically an issue, since the
categories were organized in part by the likelihood that some degree of consensus could be
reached in advance." P. 235.
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fits with the low consensus Biegel envisions for Inappropriate Conduct
(p. 326).
Yet no problem should fit within both the Dangerous Conduct
category and the Inappropriate Conduct category as Biegel envisions
them. Biegel claims that his "categories are designed to be both flexi
ble and fluid, with certain types of generic behavior fitting under more
than one category depending on specific factors that might be
present . . . . " (p. 54). He then goes on, however, to define Inappropri
ate Conduct as "immoral or offensive acts that do not fit under any of
the other" categories. 24 This statement just reinforces the idea that this
category is a catchall, including only activities that the regulator could
not place elsewhere. Of course, the problem could result from Biegel
putting hate-related websites in the wrong category. One could
imagine an argument that hate-related websites threaten the targeted
groups physical security. Given Biegel's desperate attempts to craft
a legal framework allowing the abolition of such sites (pp. 321-52),
however, if he believed they qualified for the Dangerous Conduct
label, he would likely have put them there.
The real problem may be the genesis of Biegel's categories.
Although Biegel presents them as coming from whole cloth, they
roughly correspond with: 1) criminal conduct presenting the potential
for physical harm (Dangerous Conduct), 2) criminal conduct leading
only to nonphysical harm (Fraudulent Conduct), 3) noncriminal
conduct leading to civil liability (Unlawful Anarchic Conduct), and
4) noncriminal conduct not resulting in civil liability (Inappropriate
Conduct).25 This method of considering Biegel's model explains why
he would resist putting hate-related websites in the Dangerous
Conduct category - the site operators have done nothing criminal. It
also explains why going from category one to four roughly tracks con
sensus as to the need to do something about the behavior (p. 223). As
a society, we have already made these decisions. 26 Comparing the
underlying categories with Biegel's categories clearly demonstrates the
24. P. 85 (emphasis added). Oddly enough, he also defines Unlawful Anarchic Conduct
as mutually exclusive of the other categories. He says such behavior presents no danger to
physical safety or national security, thus it cannot be Dangerous Conduct. Additionally, the
fact that the behavior does not generally qualify as fraudulent or dishonest serves as a "dis
tinguishing feature," thereby falling outside Fraudulent Conduct (the lack of fraud and dis
honesty can hardly serve to distinguish category three from category two if the two catego
ries are not mutually exclusive - and this holds true whether Biegel qualifies his statement
with "generally" or not). P. 73.
25. The two categorization systems do not completely correspond. Some actions Biegel
includes in Dangerous Conduct constitute crimes not resulting in physical harm for instance.
But, as discussed in Section II.B infra, these categorizations put strain on Siegel's model.
26. Of course Biegel might argue that the political system did not adequately consider
the views of all stakeholders in making the decision. This, however, criticizes our political
system in general, and Biegel does not propose a more effective way of canvassing and
measuring stakeholders' views.
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under inclusivity of Biegel's, despite his statement that this approach
"divide[s] . . . problem areas into four categories."27 Proper categoriza
tion of the behavior comes in step one, upon which the others rely.
B.

Miscategorization: Cyberterrorism

Even more problematic are Biegel's attempts to fit cyberterrorism
within the Dangerous Conduct category. Starting from a clean slate,
Biegel defines the Dangerous Conduct category as "composed of acts
or behaviors that may impact physical or national security" (p. 55).
Biegel uses the denial-of-service attacks of February 200028 as an ex
ample of the cyberterrorism that the Dangerous Conduct category
would cover (pp. 229-31). He employs two gambits to include these
attacks in this category. The first posits that blocking major websites,
used by so many people, presents a threat to national security (p. 233).
He supports this by saying that the United States government viewed
such behaviors in terms of national security, seemingly oblivious to the
fact that the government now appears to view everything in terms of
national security.29 Biegel's most convincing argument in this regard
turns on the fact that other attacks similar in nature would in fact
threaten national security.30
Biegel's second attempt to fit such acts into the Dangerous
Conduct heading relies on the argument that denial-of-service attacks
use intentional force directed at particular targets and result in injury
(p. 235). In developing this argument, Biegel advocates using a very
broad definition of "violent" in the online setting, which encompasses
vehement or passionate speech and extreme or intense force caused

27. P. 54. Biegel claims that by placing a problem in one of these categories, a regulator
can identify representative characteristics of the problem, and thus can better conduct the
following analysis. Although it might be helpful, i.e. to take into account what has or has not
worked on other problems in the category, it does not appear essential to the analysis. As
such, the regulator can apply the remainder of the model without this first step.
28. These attacks involved the perpetrators planting software on nonsecure computers
owned by third parties. Then, when the time came for an attack, the "cyberterrorists" mar
shaled these computers to send an extreme volume of requests to the targeted websites, with
the intent of denying others access to the sites. The websites targeted included Yahoo,
Amazon.com, eBay, CNN, eTrade, ZDNet, and Datek. Pp. 229-30.
29. P. 233. For examples of the growth of the national-security argument's influence see,
for examples, Robert Schlesinger, Citing Oil Need, Bush Pushes Energy Bill Senate Seeks
Block on Arctic Drilling, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 12, 2001, at A6 (discussing national security
interest in oil as a reason for drilling in wildlife preserves), and T. Shawn Taylor, In the
Name of Homeland Security, CHI. TRJB., Mar. 9, 2003, § 5, at 5 (discussing governmental use
of national security concerns to fight federal-employee unions and worries about sexual
harassment claims). In fairness to Biegel, he completed this book before September 11th.
Merely parroting the government line about this being a national security issue, however,
does not prove anything.
30. P. 234. Cyberterrorists previously attempted to disable communication systems. P.
234.
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by unexpected or unnatural sources.31 This allows him to place
cyberterrorism in a category in which it does not belong.
When reading this portion of the book, many will find the similari
ties to the civil-rights sit-ins in the South striking.32 There the
protesters caused a denial of service by taking up places at lunch
counters and other public accommodations that would not serve them.
By sheer numbers, they could effectively disrupt service by taking up
all the available space until the proprietors relented. The resulting
racial strife certainly had greater national security implications than
not being able to access Yahoo for three hours.33 What the "cyberter
rorists" do mirrors the civil rights protests, only in an online setting.34
In fact, Biegel himself describes the Electronic Disturbance Theater's
("EDT") attempted denial-of-service attack on the Pentagon's website
as an act of cyber civil disobedience.35 EDT calls its actions a virtual
sit-in.36 Various groups have used electronic civil disobedience to pro
test war, the treatment of minorities, and even terrorism itself.37 The
only difference between the nonviolent civil rights protests of the
1960s and these cyber protests originates from Biegel's decision to
define violence as including directing your cyber presence toward a
particular location as an act of force.38 While civil disobedience does
often result in arrest in the real world, Biegel states that cyberter
rorism - which in his view includes cyber sit-ins - "should arguably

3 1 . Pp. 231-32. This argument assumes something cyberterrorists do in directing their
attack qualifies as force.
32. An obvious difference between the two exists of course. Civil rights protesters risked
beatings and arrest to make their point while many "cyberterrorists" want to remain anony
mous. Additionally, some cyberterrorists utilize the property of innocent third parties
without their consent. P. 229. This is not true, however, of EDT. EDT protesters use Flood
net, a Java applet, that automatically reloads the targeted webpage every three seconds, but
they do not use third-party property. Jeanne Carstensen, Hey Ho, We Won't Go: Civil Dis
obedience Comes to the Web, available at http://amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists
Archives/nettime-l-9806/msg00012.html (last visited May 2, 2003).
33. See MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2000) (suggesting the civil rights movement created a national
security issue for America in the fight against communism).
34. Biegel uses the loaded term "cyberterrorists" very liberally. Those who practice
electronic civil disobedience claim their activism follows in the footsteps of Henry David
Thoreau and Gandhi. See Stefan Wray, On Electronic Civil Disobedience (1998), available at
http://www.thing.net/-rdom/ecd/oecd.html. Clearly they do not view themselves as terrorists
anymore than the civil rights protesters of the 1960s considered themselves to be terrorists.
35. P. 241. The Pentagon responded with a counteroffensive, flooding the browsers
launching the attack with graphics and messages, causing them to crash. P. 241.
36. See Paul Van Slambrouck, Newest Tool for Social Protest: The Internet,
June 1 8, 1 999, USA 3.

CHRISTIAN

SCI. MONITOR,

37. See John Lasker, Hactivists Wage War, B UFF. NEWS, May 14, 2002, at El.
38. Biegel would declare the equivalent of walking in the door of the diner and sitting
down to be an act of force.
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have the same level of punishment . . . [as] offline penalties for terror
ism. "39
It seems quite odd that Biegel himself would have to strain to fit
anything into the different categories. After all, he created them only a
few pages earlier, and one would think he could have finessed the
categories rather than warping the definitions of the conduct involved
to obtain the desired result. This may flow from the fact that the
stakeholders would likely agree that the government should do
something about such attacks40 - meaning in Biegel's framework the
behavior should fit into category one or two41 - but the actual acts
committed do not nicely fit into either Dangerous Conduct or
Fraudulent Conduct without manipulation. The fact that this behavior
does not seem to fit well within the framework prescribed leads to
additional questions about the comprehensiveness of the categories.
Perhaps more categories would solve the problem - but of course
with additional categories the attractive simplicity of the system de
clines.
C.

Ignoring the Model: Giving in to the Copyright Anarchists

In marked contrast to his recommendations concerning denial-of
service attacks, where Biegel would treat cyber activists in the same
way as real-world terrorists, he professes his willingness to abandon
the current copyright regime as being unrealistic in the online world.
Since copyright infringement constitutes one of the most cont�ntious
Internet-related problems (p. 280), Biegel does not feel the need to fit
copyright violators into the Dangerous Conduct category - despite
his argument that extreme economic harm can have national security
implications.42 Here the fact that many online users are violating the
current copyright provisions on an almost daily basis persuades him of
the wisdom of this action.43 He proposes to scrap the current copyright
39. P. 239. This does not mean cyber activists should not be punished for the crimes they
commit. It merely aims to make clear the extent of the punishment Biegel proposes, and the
activities to which he would attach those punishments. The situation requires a more
nuanced approach than Biegel advocates.
40. P. 235. For discussion of the role of consensus in Siegel's model, see supra notes 12,
23-24 and accompanying text, and infra notes 41, 43 and accompanying text.
41. Biegel contends that someone applying his method can place all problematic be
havior into one of his categories. He then specifically notes that low consensus will typify
category four and sets up category three in terms of large numbers of people on both sides of
the debate. He expects high consensus in categories one and two. P. 235.
42. P. 281. The sale of copyrighted materials accounts for six percent of the United
States' gross national product. Laurie A. Santelli, New Battles Between Freelance Authors
and Publishers in the Aftermath of Tasini v. New York Times, 7 J.L. & POL'Y 253, 269
(1998).
43. P. 280. Biegel never clarifies why radical proposals to change the substantive law
enter into the analysis. His model does allow for changes in the law in steps three through
five when the stakeholders come to agreement. This proposal does not result from an appli-
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provisions in exchange for a simpler system that online users will
understand.44
His analysis raises several potential problems. Biegel claims an
emerging pattern in the case law allows for private personal copying
under the fair-use defense.45 Yet for all of Biegel's attention to the
fair-use doctrine in relation to private personal copying, he ignores
cation of this process. Biegel makes much of the fact that stakeholders cannot come to
agreement in this field. In apparent response to this, Biegel makes a proposal that does not
resolve this inability to agree (one side will certainly reject it and the other might or might
not support it). Simply because Biegel believes his proposal well-reasoned and fair does not
mean the stakeholders will agree to it, but Biegel makes no effort to deal with this lack of
consensus.
44. P. 303. The belief that simplicity holds the key to copyright compliance undergirds
Biegel's proposed reforms. P. 303. This is a fundamentally flawed vision of the law. Biegel
argues that since no lay person could understand this area of the law, society cannot expect
Netizens to follow copyright law. Siegel's argument here rests on an unacknowledged - and
highly dubious - assumption. Namely, Biegel assumes that Netizens know about the fair
use doctrine, want to comply with it, but simply cannot figure out how to do so. P. 303. He
seems to envision Netizens combing through Westlaw searching futilely for clear conduct
rules. Many areas of the law that society expects people to obey, however, display a similar
complexity. For instance, when discussing the countermeasures various entities have taken
against cyberterrorism, Biegel provides an extensive analysis of when the occupant of a
building may inflict physical injury in defense of habitation. Pp. 242-44. The answer entails a
complex analysis that turns on a number of variables. Pp. 242-44. Yet we expect people to
conform their behavior to this standard despite the fact that they most likely have no clue
that it exists.
In fact, Meir Dan-Cohen maintains that overbreadth and vagueness, the antithesis of
clear conduct rules, can become virtues in some areas of the law such as necessity and du
ress. See, e.g., Meir Dan-Cohen, Decision Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation
in Criminal Law, 97 HARV. L. REV. 625, 639 (1984). In such situations, society benefits when
conduct rules (directed at the general populace) and decision rules (directed at those im
posing punishment for crimes) differ so as to preserve the deterrence effect of the law. Id.
The two need not fully overlap. Id. at 649. Dan-Cohen goes on to suggest that overbroad and
vague laws that exhibit simplicity, when combined with fair decisional rules, can result in
good law. Id. at 639. This, however, would not satisfy Biegel, or the purpose of the fair-use
doctrine. Dan-Cohen's method covers more than society intends to punish to provide ade
quate deterrence. Fair use does not seek to over deter, but encourages uses that qualify as
fair.
Complexity often results from an attempt to introduce fairness into the law because
society expects conduct rules and decision rules to fully overlap. For instance, "thou shal(t]
not kill," Exodus 20:13 (King James), is a simple law, but many would prefer the current
criminal law, which allows for killing in self-defense, even if the law allows only a narrow and
technical exception. The simplicity rationale is further undercut by the fact that people do
not always obey simple laws despite the fact that they can determine compliance with little
effort - the speed limit representing an excellent example. See Margaret Raymond,
Penumbra! Crimes, 39 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1395, 1397-99 (stating most Americans speed and
estimating the percentage at somewhere between sixty-seven and ninety).
45. P. 305. The fair-use defense resulted from judicial activism, a decision that fulfilling
the purpose of the Copyright Act necessitated an exception to copyright owners' rights. See
Joseph P. Liu, Copyright and Time: A Proposal, 101 MICH. L. REV. 409, 453 (2002). Eventu
ally, Congress codified the fair-use defense, requiring the courts to look at four factors: 1)
the purpose and character of the use, 2) the nature of the copyrighted work, 3) the amount
and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole, and 4)
the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. 17
U.S.C. § 107 (2003). Congress also left the courts free to consider additional factors that they
may find relevant. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1476, at 66 (1976).
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one of the major theories in the field - that fair use constitutes a form
of market failure. 46 In the past, high transaction costs made low-value
transactions unprofitable. 47 The Internet actually presented a possible
way to reduce these transaction costs and thus would diminish the
need to employ the fair-use doctrine. 48
Further, Biegel's de minimis proposal, 49 which would allow people
to download set portions of larger works and small works in their en
tirety - for private noncommercial use only - then forward them on
to a limited number of people (p. 306), advances a much more radical
theory than he admits. He does, in fact, acknowledge that Congress
would have to amend the Copyright Act to implement his proposal (p.
306), but still attempts to justify it using fair-use concerns. Thus, in
evaluating Biegel's suggested amendment, the four fair-use factors
prove useful. so
Biegel, without mentioning them specifically, seeks to justify his
proposal on two of the fair-use grounds. He, in essence, wants to col
lapse the third factor, the amount and substantiality of the portion
used in relation to the work as a whole, into a per se rule, allowing
"downloading . . . documents of less than ten pages . . . " and limited
numbers of music files - presumably meaning entire songs. s1 Here,

46. See Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use As Market Failure: A Structural and Economic
Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1 600, 1 614-15 (1982).
Gordon points out in a later piece, however, that just because no market failure remains
does not automatically mean fair use should not apply. See Wendy J. Gordon, Market
Failure and Intellectual Property: A Response to Professor Lunney, 82 B.U. L. REV. 1031,
103 1 -32 (2002). The law and economics articles which cite to Gordon largely disagree, or at
least fail to acknowledge this point.
47. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Pliability Rules, 101 MICH. L. REV. 1,
51 (2002).
48. The founding of the Copyright Clearance Center in 1 977 presented another option
- and a reason for cutting back on the fair-use defense in certain instances. See American
Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, 929 (2d Cir. 1994). The major problem to
date on the Internet revolves around an economical way to charge for these low-value trans
actions.
49. One must realize that Biegel adopts an unnecessarily confusing name for his
proposal. As he notes, copyright law already has a de minimis allowance, much more limited
than what he suggests. The de minimis doctrine allows for "trivial instances of copying," On
Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 1 73 (2d Cir. 2001), because trivial copying is not an
infringement.
50. He explicitly notes that the third fair-use factor addresses traditional de minimis
issues. P. 306.
51. P. 307. One can see where Biegel's desire for a simple Jaw begins to betray him here.
If he sticks to the simple rule, it leads to anomalous results. If someone wishes to download a
work with only one line on the eleventh page would his proposal bar this? If it does not,
Biegel finds himself back in the case-by-case line drawing business, which he designed his
simple rule to avoid. If it does, this raises another worry� Namely, inflexible Jaws often lead
to nonsensical results. Biegel does not explain why the public should prefer a simple Jaw that
leads to nonsensical results over a hard-to-interpret, complex rule striving for sensible out
comes. One also wonders if Congress must provide a standard font, type size, and margins to
guarantee compliance with this "simple" rule. Plus, Biegel's proposal seems incomplete.
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Biegel commits the cardinal sin of conflating de minimis with small.
Neither society nor copyright law judges a work by its length, and this
proposal would alter the third factor to consider only the amount
taken. As the Supreme Court noted in Harper & Row v. National
Enterprises,52 however, the heart of a work can reside in a small per
centage of the larger work, creating a need to consider substantiality.53
While Biegel would prevent people from taking books and long arti
cles in their entirety, he ignores the fact that the value of many works
lies only in a small portion of a work.54 No doubt Biegel does not ad
dress the concerns raised by the fourth fair-use factor, the effect his
proposal would have upon the potential market for, or value of, the
copyrighted work, for just this reason. Allowing everyone to download
the work for personal use would destroy the market for many
copyrighted works. Simply put, people use whole genres of
copyrighted works only - or predominantly - for private personal
and noncommercial purposes. Indeed, Biegel's proposal may present a
takings issue. His amendment to the Copyright Act would take small
works from their owners and put them in the public domain because
no work under ten pages would receive protection in noncommercial
settings and online users could download the most valuable parts of
other works (p. 307). Biegel attempts to counter this by insisting that
the purpose and nature of the use be noncommercial (p. 306)
the
first fair-use factor. He fails to acknowledge, however, that the first
factor is not the entire test because even noncommercial private uses
can destroy the value of some works.55
As for the second factor, the nature of the copyrighted work,
Biegel apparently finds this unimportant, though he concerns himself
mainly with works at the core of copyright law. Thus, Biegel plucks
out the concerns underlying two of the fair-use factors while failing to
comprehend why Congress - taking its cue from the courts included the other two factors in the test.56 The term de minimis comes
from the longer Latin phrase de minimis non curat lex, which Biegel
-

Much online infringement involves visual works, which the proposal fails to address. In fact,
to meet Siegel's goal would require more of a civil law code than a short, simple law.
52. 471 U.S. 539 (1985).
53. Id. at 564-66, 579 (finding that taking three-hundred words from a 200,000-word
book to be substantial).
54. President Ford's autobiography, at issue in Harper & Row, provides a good exam
ple. Everyone generally agrees that his reasons for pardoning President Nixon - contained
in a small portion of the overall book - provided the material of most interest to a vast
majority of the potential audience. See id. at 565, 568.
55. Plus, it focuses on the noncommercial purpose of the use ignoring completely the
nontransformative character of the use. See Kelly v. Arriba Software Corp., 280 F.3d 934,
940-42 (9th Cir. 2001) (discussing the importance of transformative character).
56. Indeed, his proposal only takes half of the concerns behind each factor he does con
sider into account.
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loosely translates as "the law does not take notice of, or concern itself,
with very small or trifling matters" (p. 306). The complete destruction
of a work's value hardly qualifies as trifling. For just this reason, de
minimis, as the courts now use the term, refers only to truly trivial
uses.57
Biegel also attempts to use the Sony Corporation of America v.
Universal City Studios Inc.58 case to support a growing trend towards
allowing private personal copying; however, this rings hollow (p. 299).
In Sony, Universal Studios and Disney brought suit against Sony
because of Sony's production of the Betamax.59 The Betamax func
tioned like a VCR,60 enabling the user to time shift "to record a
program he cannot view as it is being televised and then watch it once
at a later time."61 Content producers feared this would lead to people
watching less television and attending fewer movies.62 The holding of
the Sony decision allowed private personal copying in the context of
free, over-the-air broadcast as a fair use.63 In part, this flowed from the
Court's belief that the time-shifting would actually produce more
profit than televised shows and movies alone.64
This argument overlooks several key differences, however,
between Sony and Biegel's favorite topic, songs downloaded and
stored in the MP3 format. Justice Stevens - presciently according to
Biegel - predicted that revenues would actually increase due to time
shifting - and they have (p. 309). Downloading songs off the Internet
is not, however, time-shifting - it does not record broadcast music as
presented free over the air by its creators for one time use later.65 The
Court only authorized time-shifting, and downplayed the likelihood
people would try to build videotape libraries rather than watching the
content once and recording over the program.66 Biegel notes the Court
avoided deciding if building personal libraries of copyrighted works
without payment constitutes a fair use (p. 299). MP3s, however,
squarely present the issue because people do try to put together music

57. On Davis v. Gap, Inc., 246 F.3d 152, 173 (2d Cir. 2001).
58. 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
59. Id. at 420.
60. Id. at 422.
61. Id. at 421.
62. Id. at 452-53.
63. Id. at 425.
64. P. 300 (referring to Sony, 464 U.S. at 443, 446-47, 452-53). Given the current prere
corded videotape and DVD market, this prediction proved true.
65. The Court expressly declined to address the transfer of private copyrighted material
among individuals that Biegel advocates in his de minimis proposal. Sony. 464 U.S. at 425.
66. Id. at 421, 424 n.3, 451.
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libraries on their computers by downloading songs off the Internet.67
While increasing the number of people who see television shows does
benefit the content producers in terms of advertising rates, increased
audience without a corresponding increase in record sales provides lit
tle benefit.68
Attempting to counter this observation, Biegel writes "[f]rom the
time that audiotaping technology first developed, industry officials
have raised the specter of alleged lost profits . . . [y]et the record com
panies continue to make large sums of money, and music industry
profitability overall has shown no concrete signs of abating" (p. 308).
While this might have seemed true at the beginning of 2001, it is no
longer so.69 The profitability of the music industry dropped dramati
cally over the last several years, and industry executives blame this in
large part on the practices that Biegel wants to hold harmless.70 Biegel
suggests that the music industry should find a way to profit from this
downloading - but tellingly does not offer any suggestions as to how
to do so (pp. 300-01, 309).
67. See Hiawatha Bray, Recording Industry Shows Some Cunning, ST. PETERSBU RG
Jan. 27, 2003, at C4 (discussing use of the Internet to build music collections);
Wherehouse Music Retailer Seeks Bankruptcy Protection, HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 22, 2003,
at lOB (same).

TIMES,

68. See Jane C. Ginsburg, How Copyright Got a Bad Name for Itself, 26 COLUM. J.L. &
61, 64 (2002) ("[T]he cumulative . . . impact of private copies, particularly if the copy
ing becomes widespread and systematic, may be quite deleterious and should be pre
vented"). Concert attendance generally does not provide a benefit to the record studio that
produces an album. See Adam Sherwin, Rock Artists Sign Up to Live Bootleg CDs, THE
TIMES ( LONDON), Feb. 1 7, 2003, at Home News 5 (reporting the first contract with a leading
artist, Robbie Williams, where the studio will get a cut of the gate). Traditionally, concert
tours were meant to promote record sales, but this has changed for some of the most high
profile acts. See Rodney Ho, The Long Goodbye: On Her Latest 'Farewell' Tour, Singer Cher
Illustrates How Hard It Can Be for Those in the Limelight to Leave It for Good, ALA . J. &
CONST., Apr. 25, 2003, at IE (discussing how some acts now make more off of ticket sales
than album sales). This does not solve the problem for less well-known acts that cannot
charge exorbitant prices for tickets. Nor do groups who can charge such prices need the ad
ditional exposure, and fans willing to spend so much for tickets would likely have bought the
album if they could not download it for free.
ARTS

69. Jeff Leeds, After a Rocky Year, Time to Face the Music, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2002,
at Cl. Biegel does say "concrete signs," thereby indicating that the downward trend was al
ready apparent then. P. 308. Biegel also claims the music industry cannot base loss estimates
on the number of MP3 files downloaded because such activity differs from CD piracy. P. 309.
As Biegel himself continually points out elsewhere, however, effective does not mean per
fect. With an adequate statistical analysis the industry can establish roughly how much loss
MP3 downloading produces - though no doubt what they release publicly may skew
towards the high end of an honest analysis. His baseline reliance on CD piracy also fails all those willing to pay the price a pirate charges may not be willing to pay the authorized
price, but we do not say that the industry can establish no estimate of the loss in this situa
tion. Additionally, Biegel says, somewhat misleadingly, that "sampling" a song by down
loading it could lead to album sales - but conveniently ignores the fact that it could also rob
"one-hit wonders" of any significant revenue. P. 309.
70. Patrick MacDonald, Music-Industry Meltdown, SEATTLE TIMES, Feb. 23, 2003, at
Others blame it on the low quality of the product, id., but this does not explain the vast
numbers of people downloading the recordings now.
Kl.
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Biegel also seems to have an unrealistic view of the fair-use de
fense overall. He refers to the rights of online users in the context of
fair use (p. 295), but fair use is a shield, not .a sword.71 Infringers can
protect themselves from liability in an infringement action if they
qualify for the defense, but cannot force the intellectual property
holder to grant them access to the material. The Copyright Act only
grants copyright owners rights. Additionally, his proposal does not ac
tually provide a solution. His proposal will exist along side current
fair-use law (pp. 306-07), displacing only a portion of it, thus undercut
ting his simplicity rationale.
At a more fundamental level, one can disagree with Biegel on the
extent of Netizens' disdain for the copyright law as it now stands.
Biegel states that "Netizens [have] demonstrat[ed] a disrespect for the
[copyright] law that has arguably not been seen since the days of
prohibition. "72 Although the prevailing social norms in cyberspace
do reflect a belief that copyright laws somehow do not apply there
(pp. 74-76), this does not mean that society should abandon copyright
law on the web as it now stands because of these social norms.73 In the
past, appeals by the creators of intellectual property have proven
successful at persuading people to respect the originators enough to
not steal their work.7 4 Plus, apparent disdain for copyright law might
not run so deep as one might suppose on the Internet.75
71. See, e.g., Robert A. Kreiss, Accessibility and Commercialization in Copyright
Theory, 43 UCLA L. REV. 1, 47 (1995). The name itself indicates a defense, not an affirma
tive right.
72. P. 290. This analogy enthralls Biegel, and he uses it repeatedly in regard to the social
contract breaking down in regard to copyright. The analogy, however, is weak. Prohibition
created criminal laws, while copyright involves mainly civil violations. Ignoring criminal laws
indicates a greater breakdown in the social contract. See Raymond, supra note 44, at 1424
(discussing how rarely enforced criminal laws, which do not induce social opprobrium and
shame for violation, undercut the criminal law). In discussing the importance of the social
contract, Biegel fails to distinguish between civil and criminal liability. People can incur civil
liability without believing the law that forces payment illegitimate. One need look no further
than efficient breach of contract to confirm this. See Richard A. Posner, The Strangest Attack
Yet on Law and Economics, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 933, 935-37 (1992).
73. In the context of First Amendment social norms, Biegel advocates fighting these
norms, p. 326, even after acknowledging that change might prove impossible.
74. This observation finds support in Jane Ginsburg's latest work. See Ginsburg, supra
note 68. Ginsburg believes " [c]opyright owners [are] generally perceived to be large, imper
sonal and unlovable corporations (the human creators . . . tend to vanish from the polemic
view)." Id. at 61-62. Ginsburg specifically criticizes the view that any law "that gets in the
way of what people can do with their own equipment in their own homes" is an illegitimate
law, and labels this consumer greed. Id.
This view also finds support in J.R.R. Tolkien's experience with American copyright
law. In 1965, Ace Books published an unauthorized edition of each book in The Lord of the
Rings trilogy on the belief that the American copyright was no longer valid. William A.
Davis, Hobbit Forming, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 29, 1991 (Magazine), at 13. J.R.R. Tolkien, in
response, included the following on the back cover of each authorized book in the trilogy
published for the American market: "A STATEMENT FROM THE AUTHOR ABOUT THIS
AMERICA N EDITION: 'This paperback edition, and no other, has been published with my
consent and co-operation. Those who approve of courtesy (at least) to living authors will
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More importantly for Biegel's proposal, he seems to ignore the fact
that several of the regulatory models he uses in step four, namely code
solutions and traditional n,ational law, could implement current law
(pp. 290-91). If problems in earlier steps counsel regulators to ignore
real solutions, then the proposal is of little use. For instance, a national
law based solution to the seemingly intractable problem of Netizens
refusing to pay sales tax on Internet purchases indicates regulators
might continue working with national law solutions to good effect
without radical changes.76 As for traditional national law in the copypurchase it, and no other.' " J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE FELLOWSHIP OF THE RING back cover
(Ballatine Books 1 972) (1965); J.R.R. TOLKIEN, THE Two TOWERS back cover (Ballatine
Books 1 972) (1 965); J.R. R . TOLKIEN, THE RETURN OF THE KING back cover (Ballatine
Books 1972) (1965). Later, in 1992, a district court held that distributing a large number of
foreign published copies of the work without copyright notice - a violation of § 9 of the
1909 copyright act - does not cause invalidation. Eisen, Durwood & Co., Inc. v. Tolkien,
794 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1 992). As far as Ace was concerned, however, this ruling was
irrelevant. Even though the publishing houses believed Tolkien had no copyright protection
in America, his tactic was so effective that Ace discontinued further publications and paid
Tolkien royalties. It claimed it had not paid the royalties earlier because it did not have
Tolkien's address. Ace's own authors then simultaneously mailed their publisher the address
in a campaign coordinated by Ballatine, Tolkien's American publisher. Philip Marchand,
Ballatine and Tolkien Made Sci-Fi Go Sky High, TORONTO STAR, May 9, 1991, at ES. The
cover statement became so famous that when Signet Books published a parody of The Lord
of the Rings, the authors included a parody of the statement as well. See HENRY N. BEARD
& DOUGLAS c. KENNEDY, BORED OF THE RINGS back cover (Signet Books 1969) ("A
STATEMENT FROM THE AUTHORS OF THIS LAMPOON EDITION: This paperback edition, and
no other, has been published for the purpose of making a few fast bucks. Those who approve
of courtesy to a certain other living author will not touch this gobbler with a ten-foot
battle-lance.") The music industry recently began a similar campaign with some of its biggest
stars. See MacDonald, supra note 70.
75. On a recent visit to a discussion board, someone posted "caps" - an abbreviation of
"screen captures," frozen stills taken from moving pictures - from a television show. An
other board visitor immediately responded that he had originally produced those caps and
posted them on a different discussion board and the second poster should not have reposted
them. This led to a lively discussion with the general consensus being that the proper "neti
quette" was for the original capper to "sign" his work so he could receive credit for it, but
that once he posted it others could repost it. This suggests a respect for the author of a work,
albeit one that differs substantially from what copyright law would prescribe - both posters
were clearly violating copyright law. Posting copyrighted material on the Internet infringes
on the copyright holder's l7 U.S.C. l(g) § 106(5) right of public display. See Kelly v. Arriba
Software Corp., 280 F.3d 934, 944-45 (9th Cir. 2001); Video Pipeline, Inc. v. Buena Vista
Home Entm't, Inc., 192 F. Supp. 2d 321, 332 (D.N.J. 2002). It also violates the exclusive right
of reproduction. See Kelly, 280 F.3d at 940. Intellectual property holders might conceivably
direct such attributive impulses into a greater respect for existing copyright law or some rea
sonable variant.
76. See David Colker, Will Smoke Cloud States' Tax Vision?, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2003,
at Cl. Netizens have ignored this tax just as they have ignored copyright law, yet a solution
appears on the horizon and the states did not have to scrap their sales-tax laws to do it. The
reader should also note that this law gained no more respect or compliance among Netizens
due to its simplicity. This, despite the increasing difficulty of claiming ignorance of the law the telephonic tax filing system employed by many states insists on explaining the tax and
making the taxpayers swear under penalty of perjury that they have paid all applicable taxes.
Yet the feeling remains widespread among Netizens that only suckers pay this tax. Admit
tedly, the states must make small adjustments to reconcile certain aspects of their tax codes
but this is just the sort of "national law" solution Biegel expects.
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right arena, several options remain untried, at least in regard to certain
areas. In regard to MP3s, for example, an Audio Home Recording Act
approach, which would force the collection and payment of royalties
by MP3 manufacturers to copyright holders, might prove effective,77
as might other smaller adjustments of the current law, without a
wholesale overhaul. With respect to code-based solutions, in the very
chapter dealing with copyright infringement, Biegel himself notes a
possible solution - the Clever Content Server, which allows people to
view an image but disallows screen captures and disables the "save as"
feature on the browser (p. 319). Biegel describes this product as lead
ing to a "potentially dystopian scenario" (p. 318-19) - where appar
ently everyone would have to obey the law whether they wanted to or
not.1s
Biegel leaves the reader with the overall impression that he takes a
dim view of the current copyright law, and therefore manipulates his
regulatory model to advocate for change in deference to realism. In
light of Biegel's views of online-hate sites, this attitude betrays an
agenda-based application of the model on Biegel's part regarding the
role of consensus. In the context of online hate sites, Biegel wants to
challenge well-entrenched social norms - a.k.a. consensus - em
bodied in constitutional interpretation (p. 323) - rather than "facing
reality" as he would with online copyright social norms.
D. Corrupting the Model: Regulating Online Hate
In some ways, subjecting Biegel's analysis of online hate sites to an
overly searching scrutiny seems unfair because he essentially admits
that in devising a method of regulation for this area, he is getting his
ice skates ready in case hell freezes over (p. 326). Biegel advocates
nothing less than discriminatory regulation of speech based on content
(pp. 326, 328), which a vast majority of the American people, both
on the left79 and the right, oppose.80 Admirably, Biegel acknowledges
77. See 17 U.S.C. § 1001-1010 (2003). When someone buys an MP3 player the law could
require him or her to pay a royalty to copyright holders. Admittedly, this may well depress
the sales of MP3 players, but these devices do contribute to a significant amount of copyright
infringement.
78. The apparent downside being that the Clever Content Server is not clever enough to
distinguish between pages containing copyrighted material and those that do not and turning
the relevant features off and on as necessary - though this may come about someday with
advancing technology. This would not prevent all copyright infringement on the web, but it
would cut down on it without radical change.
79. At least as traditionally personified by the ACLU, though certain groups on the left
disagree. See Philip Gailey, A C L U Weakens Its Commitment to Free Speech , ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Apr. 11, 1993, at 2D ( discussing traditional ACLU approach and its
disagreement with some groups on the left over this approach).
80. P. 323. Of course to say that most Americans oppose content discrimination vastly
oversimplifies First Amendment law. The Court carves a number of things out from First
Amendment protection such as fighting words, Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568,
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this and moves on to applying his model in the event of a First
Amendment sea change.81 He chooses obscenity as his model for
crafting speech regulations (p. 346).
Why Biegel chooses obscenity as a model is a mystery. By hy
pothesis, he assumes a change in First Amendment law, and, logically,
regulators would shove online hate into the obscenity exception only if
the more likely First Amendment exceptions, such as incitement,
defamation, or harassment were unavailable.82 Part of this willingness
to use obscenity as a model may result from Biegel's generosity in
stating that the Supreme Court has a workable definition of obscenity
that avoids vagueness and overbreadth problems (p. 346). A quick re
view of the Court's obscenity jurisprudence calls this into question,83
especially in the online context, as Biegel acknowledges elsewhere
(pp. 41-42). Also, a First Amendment exception allowing only for the
"regulation of certain narrowly defined categories of online hate"
would seem to be unique in First Amendment law.84
571-72 (1942), expression directed to inciting imminent lawless action, Brandenbug v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 , 447 (1969), obscenity, Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and libel, New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). When evaluating if speech falls into one of
these unprotected areas, a court must consider the content. An alternative view maintains
that the Constitution allows content restrictions but bars viewpoint discrimination - a gov
ernment approved view. Am. Booksellers Assn. v. Hudnut, 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985). Ju
rists, however, cannot follow this view blindly either - situations exist where the govern
ment does have an "approved view" and it restricts speech on this basis. See, e.g., Leach v.
Carlile, 258 U.S. 138 (1922) (government and manufacturer opinions diverged on the effec
tiveness of a drug, with the government preventing the manufacturer from disseminating its
viewpoint through the mails). Suffice to say, for our purposes, a widely acknowledged con
cept exists, often labeled discrimination based on content, barring the government from do
ing exactly what Biegel proposes. See Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
81. Biegel thinks such a change possible because America lies far outside the interna
tional mainstream on this issue. See, e.g., Yahoo! Inc. v. La Ligue Contre Le Racisme &
L'Antisemitisme, 145 F. Supp. 2d 1 168, 1171-72 (N.D. Cal. 2001) (discussing French law
banning the sale of Nazi-related items); Tania Branigan, Threat of War: The Strange Journey
of a Salvation Army Boy Who Converted to a Campaign of Hate, T HE GUARDIAN, Feb. 25,
2003, at 3 (discussing conviction of Muslim preacher for using threatening or abusive lan
guage to stir up racial hatred), available at www.Lexis.com/universe; Jon Sawyer, U.S.
Money in Egypt Obtains Mixed Results, ST. LOUIS DISPATCH, Sept. 15, 2002, at Bl (noting
conviction of professor for defaming the state). He also acknowledges, however, that if the
international community reaches an agreement, the U.S. view may prevail because of the
United States' domination over the equipment of the Internet. P. 352.
82. Biegel makes clear that case law currently bars these options. Pp. 328-38.
83. Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 41 3 U.S. 49 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("we are
manifestly unable to describe (obscenity] in advance except by concepts so elusive that they
fail to distinguish clearly between protected and unprotected speech").
84. P. 347. Presumably Biegel chooses this approach under the assumption that the in
ternational community forced this First Amendment exception upon an unwilling America
who would want to comply with an international treaty calling for such an exception and no
more. At the least, this narrow approach conflicts with his reasons for analogizing obscenity
and online hate. One might expect this, as it flies in the face of Justice Scalia's majority
opinion in R.A. V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992). There the Court announced that
simply because the government could proscribe the expression entirely does not mean it can
discriminate based on the content within the proscribable area. Id. at 382-85. The First
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Returning to the regulatory aspects, the question arises as to why
Biegel opposes including private ordering85 as a model of regulation
(p. 220). His stated reason that private ordering does not satisfy the
requirement "that a regulatory model must be all encompassing, with
the potential to address almost every controversy in cyberspace" (p.
220) makes little sense.86 Biegel does acknowledge the benefits of sim
ply having the webhosting site cease to offer hate-related sites space
(p. 328). Namely, such private actors do not trigger the state action re
quirement, and hence can act where the government could not in the
face of First Amendment challenges (p. 328). While Biegel does not
believe this would suffice, webhosting requires a significant capital
outlay and adequate community pressure could convince these serv
ices of both the immorality and the unprofitability of continuing to
provide service to such sites.87 Proposing a regulatory scheme that has
no chance of implementation while paying only lip service to a practi
cal solution demonstrates an overcommitment to an academic idea,
and a weakness in Biegel's model.
CONCLUSION
One can take issue with the particulars of Biegel's framework for
evaluating and implementing regulatory changes. His categories are
not comprehensive, and the credibility of his model suffers when he
tries to force everything into one of them. At times, he appears willing
to manipulate his model to achieve substantive goals. At other points,
he seems willing to ignore real solutions to preserve the integrity of his
model. The framework itself, however, does offer several important
contributions. Namely, it forces the regulator to acknowledge that
Amendment does not, however, "prohibit[] all forms of content-based discrimination within
a proscribable area of speech . . . a particular type of . . . content discrimination does not
violate the First Amendment when the basis for it consists entirely of the very reason its en
tire class of speech is proscribable." Virginia v. Black, 123 S.Ct. 1535, 1540 (2003)
(O'Connor, J.) (allowing content discrimination in a c�oss-burning case as a true threat, the
form of intimidation most likely to inspire fear of bodily harm).
85. Private ordering involves self-regulation by Internet service providers. As private
actors, the First Amendment does not constrain them. P. 220.
86. Biegel's problem here originates with his all encompassing definition of code-based
solutions. By including such noncomprehensive. solutions as content filters on individual
computers under the code-based solution model, pp. 204-07, he can , include individually
noncomprehensive solutions in his regulatory model. This approach gives the impression
that labeling drives this analysis more than content. With such a broad definition of
code-based solutions, Biegel could have included Internet service provider self-regulation
under this heading. See p. 200 (including filter access provided by Internet service providers
as a code-based solution).
87. See Gary Williams, "Don't Try to Adjust Your Television - I'm Black " Ruminations
on the Recurrent Controversy over the Whiteness of TV, 4 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 99, 12931 (2000) (discussing the use of boycotts to effect social change, including racial justice); cf
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. 886 (1982) (discussing a .store's unsuccessful suit
against such a social-justice boycott that hurt its business).
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control of the Internet is not an all or nothing proposition. It also
provides a step-by-step analysis requiring the regulator to think about
the best way to achieve his or her goal. In the end, perhaps the most
valuable contribution comes from this methodical approach, forcing
regulators into a reasoned analysis. The question is will actual regula
tors, unlike Biegel, be willing to go where the model leads them.

